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ABSTRACT: Big data are considered at the same time a promising driver of economic 
development and a concern for possible manipulation and privacy intrusion. Data 
diffusion and their uncertain appropriability can make property rights regarding data 
less precise than those regarding traditional goods.
The article reviews some economic features of data. In many digital markets data can 
be considered a relevant input for production but hardly an essential facility.
Many data are collected in two-sided market platforms and on the one side, they are 
used to personalise services and to add quality, while on the other side of the plat-
form they contribute to make advertising collection more efficient. So, the transfer of 
personal data can be considered an implicit price for many free information services. 
Consumers are usually unaware of subsequent pervasive use of their personal data, 
and therefore give them away easily. Big data can amplify competitive advantages and 
related dominant positions, leveraging on information asymmetries.
A dominant position obtained through collection and processing of big amounts of 
personal data allow practices such as first-degree price discrimination, personalised 
advertising, and artificial degradation of services that can sometimes be considered 
competitive abuse, but it is difficult that data alone allow to maintain a true dominant 
position. 
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1. Introduction
For some years, big data have been considered one of the most promising 
drivers of economic development; yet, more recently, they are a source of 
concern for the possible market power accumulated by those who collect 
large amounts of data and have the ability to process them.
Big data are at the centre of a cluster of innovations that interact with 
each other and which, together, drive the digitalisation of markets and 
society. All are based on technological innovation and cost reduction of 
processing and communication equipment. Cloud computing can in fact 
transform into variable costs what once were fixed costs of infrastructure, 
processing and computer memories. This drastically lowers the economies 
of scale for the birth of digital start-ups and the scalability of resources 
accompanies growth without requiring significant specific investments. 
Successful companies, such as Huber or Netflix, started using computing 
power or vector maps provided by Amazon and Google, among others.
Open data refer mostly to data generated by transactions and procedures 
of public administrations and are generally big (census, fines, access to 
offices), but sometimes small (opening shopping centres, homicides), and 
can sometimes be part of the Internet of Things (data on traffic lights). 
When these large amounts of data are made available to researchers and 
businesses, innovations can emerge that lead to new ideas and new ser-
vices. Open data are therefore a potentially powerful driver of innovation.1 
But usually public administrations do not easily spoil themselves from 
the exclusive control of data, and in many countries these kind of data 
are not easily accessible.2 Many big data consist of information generated 
by machines and equipment and are generally included in the Internet of 
Things.
By Internet of Things we generally mean the diffusion of sensors and 
regulators in devices and objects that in addition to performing a specific 
measurement or regulation action produce a large amount of data on the 
phenomena to which they are connected. The most reasonable estimates 
speak of 25-50 billion connected devices within the next 10 years. This 
is an order of magnitude greater than the number of devices currently 
1 Mark Huberty, “Awaiting the second big data revolution: From digital noise to value creation”, 
Journal of Industry Competition and Trade 15 (2015): 35-47; Hal Varian, “Big data: New tricks for 
econometrics”, Journal of Economics Perspectives 28, no. 2 (2014): 3-28.
2 Ron Jarmin and Amy O’Hara, “Big data and the transformation of public policy analysis”, Journal 
of Policy Analysis and Management 35, no. 3 (2016): 715-721.
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connected to the network. Before data can be properly explored there are 
several problems that need to be addressed. First of all, devices need to be 
connected (Wi-Fi and mashup), and the same networks may have problems 
of saturation, not so much for the bandwidth employed, which is generally 
low, but mainly for latency and signal capabilities. A further problem can 
be the electric power supply needs. These data may be more useful if all 
these devices have an IP address that allows them to be managed as ele-
ments connected to the network, also for data collection and distribution. 
Then, there are all the data of a more personal nature, including data gen-
erated by transactions (financial, administrative and commercial), those 
related to surfing the net, and all user-generated contents (email, social 
networks, images, video, web content, free text), which are generally in an 
unstructured form and require semantic analysis in order to be used.3 It is 
possible to find many optimistic forecasts for the economic values of big 
data that  are expressed in very large numbers, but for now there are more 
assumptions than predictions. Generally, these forecasts are made with 
the logic: if the manufacturing costs of the entire economy fall by 1% then 
the value would be X. Thus, for example, Deutsche Bank hypothesises in 
the oil industry a 1% reduction in capital expenditure which would result 
in USD 90 billion of save costs; in smart utilities and aviation, a 1% reduc-
tion in fuel used translates, respectively, into USD 66 billion and USD 30 
billion of cost reduction.
Automotive industry, utilities, connected houses, the industrial sector 
and healthcare are usually considered the most promising sectors. While 
the theoretical potential gains are spread horizontally, almost onto the 
entire economy, concrete developments will be much more localised and 
will depend on specific competitive conditions of single applications and 
markets. In all these potential areas for digital development, there are sig-
nificant network economies that do not make it easy to start up and catch 
the potential benefits. In many cases, companies must first install a large 
number of devices, sensors or regulators in order to collect a sufficient 
amount of data, find some suitable algorithms to properly use the data, 
solve the technical problems of processing large amounts of data, and hope 
for the benefits in the end.
3 Marco Gambaro, “Some economics of new media content production and consumption, and 
strategic implication for media companies”, in Handbook of Social Media Management, ed. Mike 
Friedrichsen and Wolfgang Mühl-Benninghaus (Berlin: Springer, 2013).
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The possibility of fully internalising potential benefits is a powerful 
accelerator for efforts and investments, while in those cases where moni-
toring generates a better service for third parties or final customers, mis-
alignment of incentives and potential opportunistic behaviour can slow 
down adoption. In many cases the prevalence of private benefits at the 
beginning can speed up the initial investments, while many positive exter-
nalities make it difficult to find resources. For example, if through the sen-
sors installed in a car manufacturers are able to predict the possible break-
downs and schedule maintenance work, they will also have to convince 
customers that they are not suggesting these maintenance operations in 
order to maximise car repairs or spare parts budgets. New big data appli-
cation will generate information asymmetries between buyer and seller 
and will allow the latter possible opportunistic behaviour.
In automotive big data application a general and potentially very sig-
nificant problem of data ownership arises. If several sensors are installed 
in my car which monitor driving actions from the moment I purchase it 
from a manufacturer, are the data generated my property or are they avail-
able for the manufacturer? And if the manufacturer refuses to repair the 
car if I do not make the data available, is he abusing his position? If, in the 
same car, an insurance company installs a GPS that monitors the use of the 
vehicle, can the car’s sensor data be used, and by whom? And who can con-
trol these data: the insurance company that installed the GPS, the client 
that owns the car, or the manufacturer that builds it? These are regulatory 
problems that are not easy to solve.
Big data, together with other digital innovations, are a prerequisite and 
a driver for the emergence of new markets. This happens, for instance, in 
the sharing economy, where, even if the starting point is the presence of 
underutilised capital goods (homes and cars)4, without the widespread 
use of smartphones, the availability of traffic data, high-quality photog-
raphy technologies, low-cost mapping technologies, services like Huber or 
Airbnb would not even be thinkable.
However, the development of big data is not an easy trial and it is neces-
sary to overcome considerable troubles both in the case of data produced by 
4 Georgios Zerbas, Davide Proserpio and John Byers, “The rise of the sharing economy: 
Estimating the impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry”, Journal of Marketing Research 54, no. 
5, (2017): 687-705. 
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objects and by personal data.5 When not used to improve the specific trans-
action but to predict the performance of markets or activities, big data do 
not escape the traditional statistical traps. Although data volumes are very 
large and low-cost, they are always samples, not the universe. Secondly, 
today’s actions and information cannot be easily extrapolated to tomor-
row and, finally, what happens online is not necessarily the same as what 
happens offline.6 In this context, the fear that such large amounts of data 
could be used in improper ways and that an asymmetry of power could 
emerge between the companies that collect this data and the consumers 
who would be at their mercy is also emerging. Some recent acquisitions 
such as that of WhatsApp by Facebook, or that of Double Click by Google, 
have exacerbated these concerns and pushed the requests for regulatory 
intervention both by the legislative bodies and by the different authorities 
involved in this area, mainly antitrust and privacy.
The multiple applications of big data bring many benefits to society. They 
provide companies with valuable information that can be used to improve 
products and services, while consumers have access to more and often very 
targeted or tailored information which can help them make better deci-
sions. Examples of big data applications are online search engines, targeted 
advertising on social media, medical tools that intelligently combine dif-
ferent data sources for diagnostic purposes, and autonomous driving cars 
which rely on machine learning and a large volume of data. 
Although the benefits of big data are clear, there are also concerns 
expressed in the public debate that companies that have access to data may 
become too powerful. For some authors, data and algorithms can facilitate 
collusion and the companies that have exclusive access will direct markets.7
This contribution is organised as follows: the next paragraph describes 
some economic characteristics of data, the third paragraph reviews the 
possibilities of antitrust authorities’ intervention, the fourth discusses the 
definition of relevant market, and the fifth examines the problems of the 
ex-ante regulation and discusses some policy implications.
5 John Horton and Richard Zeckhauser, “Owning, using and renting: Some simple economics of 
the ‘sharing economy’”, NBER Working Paper 22029 (2016).
6 Maurice Stucke and Allen Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016).
7 Ecorys, Big Data and Competition (Report for the Ministry of Economic Affair, Rotterdam, The 
Nederland, 2017).
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2. Economic data characteristics
There are many possible definitions of big data that relate to different fea-
tures of data and information. A well-established approach refers to the 
large dimension of the datasets and the need to use large scale computing 
power and nonstandard methods to extract value therefrom.8 According 
to De Mauro: “Big Data is the information asset characterized by such a 
high volume, velocity and variety to require specific technology and ana-
lytical methods for its transformation into value”.9
Sometimes it can be important to stress the difference between data and 
information in general in terms of volume, velocity, variety and value.10 
The volume of data processed expands almost exponentially; many media, 
social and economic activities migrate on the internet and this generates 
tons of data every second. The velocity at which some firms access and 
analyse data is approaching real time. This kind of nowcasting can give 
the first movers a great advantage over newcomers. The variety of data is 
enabled by the spreading of digital technologies, which generate data as a 
spill over, and by capabilities of data fusion.
Data and information exhibit some specific economic features. First of 
all, they are not rivals nor inappropriable goods. Giving someone a piece 
of information does not preclude them from giving it to others nor reduce 
the subsequent possibilities of its use. The same information can be used 
several times. However, although data is non-rivalrous, it can be exclu-
sive: parties can be practically or legally excluded from access to data. For 
example, in order to obtain access to data it may be necessary for a com-
pany to build a sufficiently large customer base. There can be economic 
barriers that prevent a company from obtaining users due to network and 
to experience effects as well as scale economies. Also, personal data are 
subject to special data protection rules, which limit the gathering, process-
ing and usage of such data. Data protection rules also limit the possibili-
ties for third parties (“data brokers”) to trade data. Companies can make 
the decision not to provide access to data or may be forced not to provide 
access to data. A certain degree of exclusivity is required for private actors 
to invest in the production of scarce goods. With regards to the production 
8 OECD, Big Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital Era.
9 Andrea de Mauro, Marco Greco and Michele Grimaldi, “A formal definition of big data based on 
its essential features”, Library Review 65, no. 3 (2016): 122-135.
10 Stucke and Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy. 
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of knowledge and information, exclusivity is sometimes arranged legally 
via patents or copyrights.11
Secondly, data and information are assets with high fixed costs and low 
or no variable costs. The related markets are therefore characterised by 
strong scale economies.12
Thirdly, in markets with intensive data use, these data can usually be 
considered a relevant input, but certainly not the only one. To produce 
knowledge and value we also need other resources including computing 
skills, specialised processing software and qualified human resources to 
read and design results, computer scientists and data analysts.13 But often 
the most important barriers to a profitable use of the available data are 
those related to consolidated managerial models and the scarce capacity 
to make organisational processes flexible. This is why digital organisa-
tions that consolidated themselves with a culture of data use often have 
a flexibility advantage over established companies that have to undertake 
important and difficult organisational processes of change. From an eco-
nomic point of view, a relevant aspect of data and information is the pos-
sibility of replacing other expensive resources in production and exchange 
processes. The examples are many and concern both the substitution of 
human resources and other types of input. Within the sales department, 
recommendation systems can replace physical stores and clerks, while in 
logistics the digital monitoring and planning of the routes allow to save 
fuel; in the oil industry, preliminary analyses of the extractive potentials 
save much drilling. 
There is therefore a greater efficiency of many physical production pro-
cesses and at the same time a better design of products and services offered 
to consumers.14
With respect to traditional data, big data are more pervasive and easier 
to collect and process in large amounts, thus lowering collection costs. In 
fact, since many human activities are carried out with the support of digi-
tal applications, the collection of information requires very few additional 
monitoring costs. In many cases, information gathering is a by-product 
11 Ecorys, Big Data and Competition.
12 Gambaro, “Some economics of new media content”.
13 David Balto and Matthew Lane, “Monopolizing water in a tsunami: Finding sensible antitrust 
rules for big data” (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2753249. 
14 Michele Polo, “Consumer’s search in the era of big data”, Competition Policy International 
Antitrust Chronicle, 2017, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/CPI-Polo.pdf. 
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of a main separate activity. Many personal data are collected through 
two-sided platforms which, on the one hand, use the data to create and 
customise the service offered to customers for free or strongly subsidised 
and, on the other hand, use them to make advertising more effective, more 
productive and therefore more profitable.
Baxter presented one of the first formal analyses of a two-sided market, 
showing that the payment card provided a service only if both cardhold-
ers and merchants agreed to use a card for a transaction and explored the 
consequences of this joint demand.15 Rochet and Tirole showed that busi-
nesses such as media, dating clubs, shopping malls and videogames are all 
based on a two-sided platform framework. A market can be considered 
two-sided if the platform can affect the volume of transaction by charging 
one side of the market more and reducing the price paid by the other side 
by an equal amount. Price structure is a crucial feature of this business 
model and platforms must design it in order to bring both sides on board.16 
In two-sided markets, profit maximising prices do not necessarily take 
into account marginal costs for both groups of customers, and prices below 
marginal costs can be non-predatory. Profit maximizing prices in two-
sided markets depend on the price elasticities of demand on both sides, the 
magnitude of indirect network externalities and the marginal cost for both 
sides17. It is perfectly competitive for a newspaper, a television or a search 
engine to subsidise the information side in order to collect audience for the 
advertising side and this cannot be considered predatory pricing.
A fundamental feature of platforms is the presence of network effects: 
platforms become more valuable as more consumers use them. As more 
users engage with the platform, the platform becomes more attractive to 
potential new users. This goes a long way toward explaining why some 
platforms have had viral growth.  There are two kinds of network effects: 
direct network effects (where more users beget more users, as in more 
Facebook users will beget more Facebook users); and indirect network 
effects, where more users of one side of the platform (for example, video 
game users) attract more users on the other side of the platform (in this 
15 William Baxter, “Bank exchange of transactional paper: Legal and economic perspectives”, 
Journal of Law and Economics 34, no. 2 (1983): 309-328.
16 Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, “Platform competition in two-sided markets”, Journal of 
the European Economic Association 1, no. 4 (2003): 990-1029.
17 David Evans and Richard Schmalensee, “The industrial organization of markets with two sided 
platforms”, NBER Working Paper no. 11603 (2005).
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example, video game developers). It is important to understand that with 
platforms, scale is both the outcome of initial success and the engine for 
further growth.18
In this context, data could be considered an implicit price for the offer 
of those subsidised services. And for some scholars, data could even repre-
sent a new currency.19 First of all, it should be pointed out that in two-sided 
platforms, the implicit price is mainly represented by the attention paid to 
advertising,20 and data are indeed an accessory input to make advertising 
more effective through profiling and segmentation.  Secondly, data can-
not be considered a real currency in the economic sense because they are 
neither a scarce resource nor do they have a uniform value recognised by 
all the participants to the market. Of course, the loss of privacy generated 
by the transfer of data is a disutility for the consumer, but not enough to 
define them as a currency.
The value of data is very contingent and depends on different factors. 
Single data hardly have much value, while a large collection of data can be 
valuable. The timeliness of data can be important because often, especially 
for operational uses, the usefulness and value of data decrease over time. 
Consumers’ willingness to sell data changes according to the trust in the 
counterpart and its credibility. The same user can evaluate the transfer of 
their data in different ways according to the interlocutors and the context. 
Many signals seem to indicate how the contingent value of own personal 
data is fairly low for consumers, also because the transfer of data is never 
exclusive. However, there are no structured assessments on the size of the 
value and on the determinants of the changes.
Much research shows that consumers are concerned about the use of 
their personal data. According to Pew Research (2016), 71% of American 
adults think that consumers have lost control over how their data are col-
lected and used by companies and few express the belief that their data 
remain private and secure once they have been collected.21
18 Annabelle Gawell, “Big data: Bringing competition policy in the digital era”, Working Paper, 
OECD (2016).
19 David Evans and Richard Schmalensee, “The antirust analysis of multisided platform business”, 
Coase Sandor Working Paper Series, University of Chicago Law School (2012).
20 Marco Gambaro, “Concorrenza e pluralismo nel mercato di Internet: La prospettiva econom-
ica”, in Le Libertà Fondamentali nell’Era di Internet, ed. Marco Bassani, Oresto Pollicino and 
Tommaso Frosini (Milano: Mondadori, 2017).
21 Pew Research, “The state of privacy in post Snowden America”, Pew Research, 2016, http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-in-america/.
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Naturally, the consumer might be able to choose which data to sell and 
in which contexts, and therefore the situation that is observed is simply the 
representation of consumer preferences. But this kind of market discipline 
and this possible role of the consumer require two important conditions: 
the availability of complete information on the various contingencies and 
the presence of real and possible alternatives that can trigger a competitive 
market. In many situations these two conditions are not verified. Many 
empirical researches, as well as daily experience show how consumers are 
not informed about the implications of the transfer of their personal data, 
either because reading very long written disclaimers in very small char-
acters is practically impossible for anyone, or because producers do not 
clarify the different transfers and processing of the data and the possible 
subsequent uses.22
Even from an economic point of view, consumer concern is not irra-
tional because, if information is power, the information asymmetry cre-
ated with companies can shift the balance of power in future transactions. 
If sellers are able to tell how little I know about the products I want to buy, 
they will try to direct me to a product that is more convenient for them 
than for me. Indeed, companies do not have socially optimal incentives to 
aim for a correct matching between products and customers.23
The transfer of data by consumers generally takes place in exchange for 
an immediate benefit (a service or a product) and involves uncertain costs, 
spread in a future and little-known period. It is therefore not clear that the 
consumer is able to correctly evaluate the trade-offs associated with the 
transfer of information.
In recent years, in particular, concerns have emerged regarding the col-
lection and use of personal information, a problem which, as we have seen, 
has an economic dimension, but which extends to other areas of social 
interaction. In fact, the absence of relevant information asymmetries and 
the availability of reliable and reasonably objective information are a pre-
requisite for the proper running of the political decision-making system, 
of the financial market and of course for the operating of the markets of 
goods and services.
And so, if a large part of social interactions are mediated by plat-
forms that collect personal data and monitor consumer behaviour and 
22 Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis Taylor and Liad Wagman, “The economics of privacy”, Journal of 
Economic Literature 54, no.2 (2016): 442-492.
23 Acquisti, Taylor and Wagman, “The economics of privacy”, 442-492.
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information choices, concerns arise precisely regarding all these inequali-
ties and information asymmetries. Moreover, it is difficult to maintain that 
the information collected is relative and proportional to the services pro-
vided. Applications on mobile phones provided by the largest digital plat-
forms require, among other things, the possibility to modify the address 
book and the contents of the device, the possibility to activate the micro-
phone and the camera, to read all the contents of the memories, download 
files without notification, and send communications without the owners’ 
knowledge. This information collection represents a particularly high 
degree of potential control whose results are beginning to be seen. A man 
was talking to a friend face to face complaining about plant pests and, 
shortly after, he received the personalised advertising of an insecticide. The 
conversation had evidently been intercepted by the phone’s microphone 
and some robot had recognised the relevant keywords.
Large digital platforms, based on the analysis of traffic and interaction 
data, are able to send personalised content, capable of influencing the 
mood and orientation of users. But what happens if who controls a plat-
form decides to run for a public office or decides to support any candidate?
The collection, analysis and use of large amounts of personal data bring 
out problems that simultaneously affect the economic behaviour of mar-
kets, generate inequality and ease intrusion into the personal sphere.
When a car that is now equipped with a digital control unit and a GPS 
collects data on wear and tear of different components and on the driving 
style, how one can be sure that the suggested maintenance interventions 
are based on the real need and not to maximise the revenues of its repair 
services centres? And who is the owner of these data: the manufacturer, 
the insurance company, or the owner of the car? Privacy and data sharing 
therefore represent a terrain at the intersection of different disciplines and 
regarding which it is possible to think of interventions of a different nature 
that may concern the promotion of competition, the defence of intellectual 
property of personal data, consumer protection or defence of privacy as a 
fundamental right.24
24 Wolfgang Kerber, “Digital markets, data, and privacy: Competition law, consumer law, and data 
protection”, Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 14 (2016).
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3. Range of antitrust action
Data can generate market power in several ways. The presence of direct 
and indirect network effects can lead to a snowball effect where the mar-
kets tip in favour of a small number of players. The learning curves are 
strong and steep with the growing importance of self-learning algorithms 
which may substantially increase the first-mover advantage. The multi-
sided relationship between different markets may ease the leverage of a 
dominant position from one market to the other.25
The German Competition Authority initiated an investigation in March 
2016 into the suspicions that Facebook’s specific terms of service on the 
utilization of user data could represent an abuse of its possibly dominant 
position in the market for social networks, and, in December 2017, issued 
a statement of objections where it is assumed that Facebook is dominant 
on the German market for social networks, and that the undertaking is 
abusing its dominant position by making the use of its social network con-
ditional and being allowed to limitlessly amass every kind of data gener-
ated by using third-party websites and merge them with users’ Facebook 
accounts.
Access to data may be one of the reasons why a company has a competi-
tive advantage over its rivals. This advantage can be persistent if data result 
in entry barriers. This is the case when new entrants are unable either to 
collect the data or to buy access to the same kind of data, in terms of vol-
ume and/or variety, as established companies. Data can be an important 
input contributing to market power but, as follows from the defined char-
acteristics, there can be other important inputs as well. Besides, in many 
cases, data can be non-rivalrous, ubiquitous, and with low barriers to 
entry. In other cases, data are at least to some extent exclusive and without 
substitutes. This makes a case by case analysis necessary whereby the char-
acteristics of the data and the business model in which they are used need 
to be considered. Companies with market power can behave in ways that 
harm consumer welfare. However, market power can also bring benefits. 
Companies in industries with economies of scale, for example, have some 
degree of market power which is efficient from a welfare perspective, since 
costs per product or service are lowered. More generally, in many markets, 
companies have a certain amount of market power, and entrepreneurial 
25 Marc Burreau, Alexandre de Streel and Inge Graef, “Big data and competition policy: Market 
power, personalized prices and advertising”, Project report, Centre on Regulation in Europe (2017).
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activity often corresponds to developing a unique business proposition 
which temporarily results in market power. Yet, problems may occur if 
market power becomes substantial or is sustained for too long due to entry 
barriers. In such situations, companies may become dominant, which, in 
turn, may give rise to abuse of dominance. Assessing harm arising from 
market power has, however, become more difficult in data-driven markets, 
which are often multisided markets. This is because in multisided mar-
kets, prices reflect ways to generate network effects, possibly irrespective 
of underlying marginal cost levels. As such, it has become more difficult 
to assess if a price is above the competitive price, because such a reference 
point no longer exists in these markets.26
Some recent acquisitions by large platforms, such as WhatsApp by 
Facebook or DoubleClick by Google, have generated much debate on the 
possible role of Antitrust in the control of possible abuse of dominant posi-
tions by the platforms that collect large amounts of data.
The underlying reasoning roughly assumes that the fundamental mech-
anisms of the internet lead to a progressive concentration of the market 
mainly due to personal data collected which, beyond a certain threshold, 
would make it impossible for a new entrant to replicate the skills and data 
of the leaders.27
In this view, the collection of personal data is characterised by econo-
mies of scale in the sense that the larger the collection of data, the greater 
the value one can extract. According to this line of reasoning, data could 
be considered as an essential facility in the future. In the value chain of 
big data, which includes collection, storage and analysis, there are many 
direct and indirect network effects that can be identified by the antitrust 
authorities. This requires an understanding of the interactions and pos-
sible feedback loops between data and other inputs in a sense of looking 
at the whole supply chain rather than analysing single parts separately28. 
Looking at market shares is often misleading because this kind of com-
petition is mainly dynamic and for the market.29 The recent history of the 
internet is full of cases in which a strong control over data relevant to that 
26 Ecorys, Big Data and Competition.
27 Nathan Newman, “Search, antitrust and the economics of the control of user data”, Yale Journal 
of Regulation 31, no. 2 (2016): 401-454.
28 Burreau, Streel and Graef, “Big data and competition policy”.
29 Giuseppe Colangelo, “Big data, piattaforme digitali e antitrust”, Mercato Concorrenza e Regole 
18, no. 3 (2016): 425-460.
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particular market could not defend the position of an incumbent against 
a competitor able to have a better business idea. For instance, the accumu-
lation of search data by the former leader Yahoo! did not prevent Google 
from prevailing thanks to a better idea for site ranking. Facebook outper-
formed both Friendster and Myspace because it organised the social net-
work more effectively for users. Dating sites are another example of market 
share instability. This is one of the oldest online sectors where the use of 
personal data has always been intense to feed the matching algorithms. In 
2006 Yahoo! Personal was the undisputed leader with a user base twice as 
large as any competitors’. But instead of maintaining permanent domi-
nance, it abandoned the market less than four years later.30 According to a 
survey by Pew Research, 6 of the 10 most popular dating sites in 2005 no 
longer existed in 2013. Today the market is headed by a few dominant sites, 
but there are over 2500 online dating sites only in the United States. The 
network effects that could push toward concentration have been super-
seded by users’ multihoming, as many customers maintain their profile 
on several sites, and by specialisation towards a specific audience segment. 
Of course these examples cannot be generalised, and it is possible that in 
many situations the exclusive control of data can lead to exclusion of com-
petitors and monopolisation of the market.
When the search results for publisher sites disappeared from the top 
positions of the search engine in the course of a trade dispute between 
Google and Hachette, many observers suspected that the natural search 
results could also be driven by strategic interests. Therefore, the informa-
tion offered to consumers can be slanted to accommodate profit maximi-
sation aims of search engines and become less credible. 
From the review of the literature and the analysis of the different mar-
kets involved, it emerges that the assessment of competitive effects of the 
control of big data is contingent and depends on many factors, includ-
ing the specific network effects and the interactions between online and 
offline. It is therefore necessary to carefully evaluate eventual market 
power on a case-by-case basis and assess the possible role of the controlled 
and whether these constitute an obstacle to competition. But for a market 
leader to maintain a sustainable competitive advantage over time, potential 
30 David O’Connor, “Understanding online platform competition: Common misunderstandings”, 
Internet Competition and Regulation of Online Platforms, Competition Policy International (2016).
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competitors need to be unable to realistically replicate the benefits of a spe-
cific strategy or input.31
This is only rarely achieved in the case of data. The fact that data are a 
non-rival good means that even if the consumer has sold them to a com-
pany, the company can easily give them to others. In addition, there is 
a flourishing intermediate market for aggregators who gather data from 
various sources and resell them to businesses. Although from consumers’ 
point of view this market can be questionable and problematic, its pres-
ence makes it difficult to implement exclusionary practices through data. 
The use of data requires the development of specific algorithms that start 
to be self-learning and which can sometimes reinforce an advantage of the 
first move. Some of these algorithms can be obtained from third parties, 
as happens with cloud computing for computing power, transforming a 
fixed cost into a variable cost and making this type of activity scalable. 
A specific problem concerns the value of data, both for consumers and 
for companies that collect them. From the few works done on this topic, 
the value for the consumer is often very contingent and depends on the 
trust in the counterpart, on the expectations regarding the future use of 
data and on the frame surrounding the decision.32 Many factors seem to 
indicate that the implicit evaluation is generally quite low, given the ease 
with which data are transferred.33 At the same time, however, the transfer 
of data, as we have seen, occurs without the consumer being aware of sub-
sequent uses and consequences to himself.
A recent experiment shows how the willingness to provide sensitive data 
is drastically reduced when the term privacy is made salient, even in a 
positive context.34 This would seem to indicate that people are often inat-
tentive and that hidden privacy concerns arise only when consumers are 
asked a specific question.
As regards personal data, consumers display considerable inertia and 
tolerance. Only 2-4% of customers terminate their contractual relation-
ship after receiving a data breach notification. One explanation could 
31 Anja Lambrecht and Catherine Tucker, “Can big data protect a firm from competition?”, 2016, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2705530.
32 Francesco Feri, Caterina Giannetti and Nicola Jentzch, “Disclosure of personal information 
under risk of privacy shocks”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 123 (2016): 136-148.
33 Simeon Schudy and Verena Utikal, “You must know about me – On the willingness to share 
personal data”, Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization 141 (2017): 1-13.
34 Helia Marrienos et al., “‘Now that you mention it’. A survey experiment in information, inatten-
tion and online privacy”, Journal of Behavior & Organization 140 (2017): 1-17.
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be that customers do not regard the resulting damage as great enough 
to change their behaviour. Another is that consumers numb consider-
ing the frequency and the number of breaches reported in the news. In a 
controlled laboratory experiment, Feri, Giannetti and Jentzsch show that 
breach notifications change the individual propensity to provide sensitive 
personal information. Notifications induce the sub group of individuals 
with personally sensitive information to reduce the disclosure of informa-
tion with firms.35
Moreover, there is no objective parameter to identify the value of the 
data. The reference should be the price that consumers accept to release 
their data, the price they would pay to protect them, the costs in which 
they expect to incur in case of incorrect use of the data, or the expected 
profits generated by use of their personal data.
A dominant position obtained through the control of personal data can 
facilitate some potential abuses: first-degree price discrimination, per-
sonalised advertising and the degradation of service quality. Naturally, 
in evaluating these possible behaviours, it is also necessary to take into 
account the advantages of efficiency and improvements of the products 
obtained with the use of big data.
In the first-degree price discrimination, sellers with monopoly power are 
able to know buyers’ reserve price and, if they can prevent arbitrage, they 
are able to fix for each consumer a price equal to their reserve price. The 
economic effect is that the seller can appropriate the full consumer surplus 
generated by the transaction. The welfare effects of this price discrimina-
tion are ambiguous because, if sellers can prevent arbitrage, then they can 
serve all the demand willing to pay a price higher than the marginal cost, 
which is equal to the demand served in a competitive market. With a first-
degree price discrimination, a monopolist produces the same quantity 
than in effect competition and therefor there in no allocative inefficiency. 
Yet, the entire consumer surplus is forfeited by the seller. This market out-
come does not directly pose welfare or competitive problems, but certainly 
questions the distribution of value. On the other hand, first degree price 
discrimination implies an expansion of the market as consumers with 
low willingness to pay are served. Although in theory a deep knowledge 
of consumers and the lack of transparency of the market (consumers are 
unaware of the prices proposed to others) could allow the application of 
35 Feri, Gianetti, and Jentzsch, “Disclosure of personal information”, 138-148.
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personalised prices, in practice and for the moment this tool does not seem 
to be used much because it clashes with a strong annoyance of consumers. 
Experiments are often done in secrecy. When Amazon was discovered to 
offer different prices depending on consumers, it had to quickly reverse. 
Generally, simpler systems are used, such as time discrimination, in the 
case of airlines, or special pricing for large groups.
To overcome the opposition of consumers, personalised prices can be 
implemented with less recognisable design, such as a uniform price and 
personalised discounts, and it is possible to show different products to 
consumers of different groups depending on their willingness to pay. 
Naturally, complex pricing systems can loosen competition and raise con-
sumer search costs.
Personalised advertising consists of showing a banner or a sponsored 
search result to a specific audience based on personal characteristics or 
interests.36 From advertisers’ perspective, the potential benefits are that the 
ad is shown to potentially interested customers and this reduces both the 
useless messages and the annoyance of the consumer and, secondly, that 
the ad content can be customised, potentially increasing the effectiveness 
of the advertising message37. If personalised advertising is an improvement 
in efficiency, and if not all competitors are able to achieve it at the same 
level, then one can expect an increase in concentration and market power, 
with a simultaneous price increase.38 The question of pricing, however, 
is a bit controversial because normally media sell targeted advertising at 
higher prices than traditional advertising, depending on how much the 
effectiveness of advertising increases. So, potential efficiency gains are usu-
ally captured by media instead of advertisers, who can anyway avoid use-
less advertising. From the point of view of consumers, the welfare effects 
can be different: on the one hand, they receive advertisements closer to 
their interests and therefore potentially more useful, but on the other hand 
seem to be annoyed because they feel under control. Often platforms do 
not allow advertisers very personal customisations because of this fear.
36 Marco Gambaro and Riccardo Puglisi, “What do ads buy? Daily coverage of listed companies on 
the Italian press”, European Journal of Political Economy 39 (2015): 41-57. 
37 Avi Goldfarb, “What is different about online advertising”, Review of Industrial Organization 
44, no. 2 (2014): 366-376.
38 Burreau, Streel and Graef, “Big data and competition policy”.
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4. Definition of relevant market
The definition of a relevant market in the big data value chain presents sev-
eral problems due to the complex vertical articulation of the activity and 
the numerous players involved, where each company plays several roles at 
the same time.
Data can have multiple roles in the economy of digital markets. They can 
be a product in itself, with a specific price, as happens in the intermediate 
market chain – operators and brokers exchange data to complete their col-
lections –  or they can be an input, which helps to define the characteristics 
and needs of customers or to reduce the risk, as is the case in many finan-
cial transactions.39
Therefore, the definition of the relevant market can specifically focus only 
on the data when these are actually the main product that is exchanged. In 
this context, the intermediate market for data seems to operate reasonably 
competitively with many operators, although the issue of vertical integra-
tion, that is, operators operating in multiple layers of the value chain, can 
be relevant.
In digital markets the simple analysis of market shares does not say 
much about the consolidated market power of the main vendors because 
competition has a strong dynamic component and often takes place for 
the market rather than in the market. In the first decades of internet dif-
fusion life cycles have been extremely short with established leaders who 
get knocked out within a few years. Potential competition often emerges 
from new entrants able to redefine business models with the addition of 
ingredients which the incumbent did not think about before, as in the case 
of Huber, or which simply redefine the production function with a differ-
ent combination of inputs, as in the case of Google. Digital environment 
makes this flexibility easy both through the development of numerous 
intermediate markets for specific services, such as payment services, data 
centres, or specialised software, and through a general reduction in data 
processing and communication costs, which together have the effect of 
lowering economies of scale.
This flexibility and this vertical articulation mean that many compa-
nies perform multiple roles both vertically and horizontally at the same 
time, and that their strategic location evolves rapidly. A typical example is 
Amazon, which few would have thought ten years ago to be a competitor 
39 OECD, Big Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital Era.
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of Microsoft or Google, but which playing on the flexibility of its vertical 
integration entered into intermediate markets, such as cloud computing, 
becoming one of the leaders. Or Apple, which is simultaneously a multi-
sided platform, a technology vendor, an IT service provider and a multi-
media content operator.
In all these activities some scope economies frequently emerge which are 
sometimes company specific. The definition of the relevant market must 
therefore be made according to the specific case and it is not always pos-
sible to generalise. Many digital markets are characterised by a multisided 
structure with both informational and transactional platforms. Although 
the concept of two-sided market has now entered the standard equip-
ment of the antitrust authorities, the analysis of cases concerning it are 
not always carried out fully considering the implications of this specific 
feature.40
The key element of the two-sided platforms are the externalities that a 
transaction on one side of the market exerts on operators and transactions 
on other side. In the traditional example of the media market, a hypotheti-
cal increase in prices on the editorial side rises the revenues and lowers 
the number of readers, but at the same time this makes the platform less 
attractive for advertising investors, making the revenues’ decrease bigger.
The identification of the relevant markets on different sides can be 
complicated when platforms supply free services in exchange for data 
that are mainly used in advertising. Equally complex is the definition 
when the different firms considered have a portfolio of different multi-
sided activities that overlap only partially which achieve specific econo-
mies of scope and are characterised by different reciprocal externalities. 
Through the use of personal data, platforms can offer consumers a vari-
ety of personalised, subsidised and sometimes totally free services, which 
makes it difficult to apply the SSNIP (small but significant non-transitory 
increase in price) test, which remains one of the standard tools for defining 
the boundaries of the market.
The solution may be to evaluate the possible quality degradation (i.e. a 
reduction in production costs) that an operator with market power can 
implement through a modified test such as the SSQNDQ (small but sig-
nificant non-transitory decrease in quality).
40 David Evans, “The online advertising industry: Economics evolution and privacy”, Journal of 
Economics Perspectives 23, no. 3 (2009): 404-450.
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The problem is that the degradation of quality can also be implemented 
for other reasons, some of which can be sanctioned from the point of view 
of competition law. 
Degradation can occur selectively on some groups of consumers to sup-
port price discrimination. To push users with high willingness to pay to 
take the most expensive version of a service, it is possible to degrade the 
quality of service for other users, which is relatively simple and inexpen-
sive in the digital environment.
Or a firm can implement a degradation of service to customers who use 
the services of competitors in other sides of the market. For example, a 
search engine could eliminate the natural search results of content provid-
ers, with which it does not has a revenue sharing agreement, from the top 
positions, but this would be a case of exclusion that is well managed with 
traditional tools of the antitrust authority.
5. The space for regulation policies
Big data can be considered amplifiers of other competitive advantages and 
pose different problems in the relationship between citizens and firms and 
between citizens and public authorities. They can contribute to the crea-
tion of information asymmetries that can have negative consequences on 
the functioning of the society.
Given the multiform nature of the issue of big data, it is not so clear if 
new regulation systems are needed and which the appropriate contexts to 
build them are. In particular, it is important to consider whether competi-
tion law should be expanded to pursue public policy objectives concern-
ing consumer protection, economic justice or fundamental rights such as 
privacy.
I think this is an unpromising path, because it would mean distorting 
both antitrust instruments and objectives, and because antitrust inter-
venes ex post on specific cases and this approach is not suitable to manage 
policy choices that can be more general in nature.
Many issues related to big data are better managed through consumer 
protection or Intellectual Property Rights regulation. But policies that are 
intended to protect consumers and privacy may have the side-effect that 
they make entry into a market more difficult. Such entry barriers can have 
a negative effect on dynamic competition, incumbents are not challenged 
by new disruptive business models as much as they would with be with-
out those barriers. A new entrant can for example not buy personal data 
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on a data-brokering market as this is not allowed without user consent. 
Compliance with consumer and privacy protection legislation requires 
investments and can make it difficult for small companies to operate on 
a market and to compete effectively with companies with a larger scale. 
It is desirable that in the design of consumer and privacy protection rules 
the effects on competition and specifically entry barriers are considered to 
maximise dynamic efficiency.41
In May 2018, after two years of transition, the General Data Protection 
Regulation of the European Parliament became active. The EU GDPR is 
a wide ranging personal data protection regime of far greater magnitude 
than any similar previous regulation in the EU, or elsewhere. Fostering 
individual rights to access, rectify, transfer and request the deletion of per-
sonal data, the regulation essentially gives back data ownership to more 
than 500 million data subjects within the EU rather than leaving them in 
the hand of the companies that store and process users’ data.
Both the sharing42 and the protecting of personal data can have posi-
tive and negative consequences at both the individual and societal levels. 
On the one hand, personal information has both private and commercial 
value, and the sharing of data may reduce frictions in the market and 
facilitate transactions. But on the other side the use of personal data may 
subject an individual to a variety of costly practices, including price dis-
crimination in retail markets, quantity discrimination in insurance and 
credit markets, spam, and risk of identity theft, in addition to the disutility 
inherent in just not knowing who knows what or how they will use the 
information in the future.
Many of the transactions with digital operators are characterised by 
information asymmetries, and consumers are not always aware of the 
value of their personal data and of the use that will be made thereafter.
Moreover, in recent years, with electronic commerce, consumers’ con-
tractual position has steadily worsened. Usually consumers pay before 
receiving the product and bear on their shoulders a large part of the risk 
associated with any economic transaction. The wave of consumer protec-
tion regulations that happened in the 70s and 80s developed mandatory 
information disclosure, warranty rights and withdrawal rights, some-
what limiting the arbitrary bargaining power of companies. In traditional 
41 Ecorys, Big Data and Competition.
42 Acquisti, Taylor and Wagman, “The economics of privacy”, 442-492.
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commerce, the consumer selects the product in the shop, tries it, takes 
possession of it and at that point pays it; sometimes, with consumer credit, 
they pay it in instalments later.
Advanced payment has become a standard practice in e-commerce 
and the consumer suffers the risks of non-delivery, defective prod-
ucts, non-compliant products, and all possible delays. The fulfil-
ment of a purchase starts only when the payment is made. It is a very 
important shift in power that is not always adequately emphasised. 
With the massive collection of personal information, contractual bal-
ance can move further in favour of sellers, who can choose whether to 
discriminate prices, while the consumer unconsciously provides pri-
vate information on preferences, or reserve prices, which will then be 
exploited to extract the entire generated surplus from the exchange. 
If firms have all the bargaining power, the only possibility for the con-
sumer is to accept terms and conditions or not to use services that are often 
almost indispensable for social relations.
I believe that in the next few years a new wave of consumer protection 
regulations will be deployed which will tend to slightly rebalance informa-
tion and power asymmetries between firms and consumers, taking into 
account the new digital landscape.
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